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Abstract 
Previous studies show that smokers are likely to be more impatient and 
prefer immediate benefits compared with non-smokers. Thus, smokers are 
regarded as myopic people and therefore have a high time discount rate. Such a 
tendency is thought to be related not only to short-term benefits (as opposed to 
long-term benefits), but also free-riding behavior. Using individual data, this paper 
examines which types of government spending smokers with such characteristics 
prefer. The important findings are: (1) smokers consider the amount of government 
spending on social security and unemployment measures to be low and (2) smokers 
perceive their tax burden to be high. These findings imply that smokers tend to 
place greater importance on public expenditure that they will personally benefit 
from, but they are less willing to bear its cost. It is inferred from the estimation 
results that those who are myopic do not consider long-term benefits, which can 
result in a number of personal problems in the future, and they anticipate 
government expenditure will help them with such problems. That is, to enjoy the 
benefit of free riding, seemingly myopic people are more likely to prefer 
expenditure on social security and unemployment measures.  
 
JEL classification: D3; H51, H55 
Keywords: smoker; government spending; perceived tax burden; free rider. 
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1. Introduction  
 
In policy making, it is important to understand the motivation behind 
individuals’ preferences for specific government spending. Based on cost−benefit 
analysis, policy makers evaluate each project and can then calculate the optimum 
level of allocation of government spending. There already exist a number of 
empirical studies on individual preferences for public spending. Based on survey 
data, classical studies have been conducted that largely examine the influence of 
economic factors on the willingness to pay for specific government projects (e.g., 
Strauss and Hughes 1976; Hockley and Harbour 1983; Ferris 1983, 1985; 
Schokkaert 1987). More recently, to closely examine the individual demand for 
public spending, economic researchers have taken into account not only traditional 
economic factors, but also psychological factors (Delaney and O’Toole 2007, 2008). 
Delaney and O’Toole (2007) suggest that perceptions regarding welfare cheating 
are negatively associated with the preference for social welfare spending. To 
systematically analyze how people perceive the cost and benefit of public goods, it 
is also necessary to explore individual attitudes towards tax. An individual’s 
perceptions regarding tax is closely related to their preference for government 
spending. This matter has been empirically explored in numerous studies (e.g., 
Cuccia and Carnes 2001; Gemmell et al., 2003; Feld and Larsen 2012; Oh and 
Hong 2012).  
Recent studies by psychological and behavioral economic researchers provide 
various findings concerning time preferences and attitudes towards risk, which are 
considered key factors to determine individual behavior (Ikeda et al. 2010; Ikeda 
2012; Kang and Ikeda 2014). For instance, time preference is closely related to the 
levels of tax, gambling, and obesity (Ikeda 2012). However, existing studies do not 
consider how time discounting is related to preferences for government spending 
and the perceived tax burden. To closely examine individual perceptions of 
government spending and tax, this paper deals with the determinants of specific 
government spending as well as the perceived tax burden by focusing on individual 
time preferences. 1  The goal of this paper is to bridge public economics and 
psychological (behavioral) economics to consider how individual time preference 
affects public finance. 
It seems appropriate to argue that impatient and myopic people attach greater 
                                                   
1 Yamamura (2014a) provides evidence that trust in government by residential area is 
negatively associated with the individual’s tax burden. 
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importance to the current benefit than the future benefit. In other words, they tend 
to enjoy the short-term benefit at the expense of the long-term benefit. Thus, 
individuals’ time preferences are considered to affect their decision making. A 
number of empirical studies provide evidence that smokers are more impatient 
than non-smokers and are more present-oriented (e.g., Sato and Ohkusha 2003; 
Khwaja et al. 2006a, 2006b; Ida and Goto 2009a, 2009b; Harrison et al. 2010). 
Smokers tend to be less patient when making choices for the immediate future 
compared with those for the distant future (Kang and Ikeda 2014). The fact that an 
individual’s discount rate is reflected in smoking behavior is useful to investigate 
how an individual with a high discount rate behaves and perceives in the real 
world. That is, whether or not people smoke can be used as a proxy for their 
discount rate (Munashinghe and Sicherman 2006).2  
In this paper, following the arguments of Munasinghe and Sicherman (2006) 
and Yamamura (2014b), a smoking dummy is used as a proxy for a high discount 
rate. For this purpose, individual-level data from the Japanese General Social 
Survey (JGSS) is used because it includes information on smoking, perceived tax 
burden, and subjective evaluations about various types of government spending. 
The major finding of the present study is that those who are impatient tend to 
consider that there is insufficient government spending on social security and 
unemployment measures. This indicates that they demand greater amounts of 
government spending on social security and unemployment measures.  
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the 
testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and empirical method used. In 
Section 4, the empirical method and estimation results are exhibited. The final 
section provides some conclusions. 
 
2. Hypotheses 
The rest of one’s life is clearly expected to be longer for young people than old 
people, and therefore this produces different incentives between the young and the 
old when evaluating government spending. Assuming people rationally pursue 
self-interest, the young are more likely to evaluate government spending from a 
long-term perspective than older people. For instance, people will only enjoy the 
benefit of government spending on education if the return from education is 
                                                   
2 Previous studies have examined how smoking is associated with economic outcomes such 
as wage rate, use of seatbelts, and experience of injury (e.g., Hersch and Visvusi 1990; 
Hersch 1996; Levine et al. 1997; Viscusi and Hersch 2001).  
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reflected in an increase in earnings through the accumulation of human capital. 
That is, it takes a long time for taxpayers to enjoy the outcome of such spending. 
Therefore, people are required to have a reasonable life span and be patient to gain 
the returns from education. In contrast, people can immediately enjoy the benefit 
of government spending on pensions and health-care services. The time lag 
between such spending and its outcome is small. Therefore, this type of 
government spending is useful even for those who are impatient and are nearing 
the end of their lives. All other things being equal, the young demand greater 
government spending on education, while older people demand greater 
government spending on social welfare (Sorensen 2013). This shows the possibility 
that time preferences vary according to age.  
A similar argument also holds true between smokers and non-smokers, 
which is inferred from empirical evidence regarding the difference between the two 
groups in terms of time preference (e.g., Sato and Ohkusha 2003; Khwaja et al. 
2006a, 2006b; Harrison et al. 2010). Smokers have a high time discount rate and 
are therefore regarded as more impatient than non-smokers. Smokers also tend to 
drink alcohol and gamble heavily (Ida and Goto 2009a; 2009b). 3  Therefore, 
smokers are inclined to incur debt and this eventually leads to financial ruin 
(Ikeda 2012). Social security and unemployment measures are valuable for those 
who have experienced such problems. Thus, one can argue that “seemingly myopic” 
people behave impatiently because they anticipate that they can enjoy public 
support even after their failures in the future. That is, spending on social security 
and unemployment measures cause the moral hazard problem of seemingly myopic 
people. Rational but present-oriented people have an incentive to demand greater 
spending to support them in the future in their times of need. Accordingly, I raise 
Hypothesis 1. 
 
Hypothesis 1: 
Smokers are more likely to demand government spending to support those who are 
in dire financial circumstances.  
 
Even though rational and seemingly myopic people benefit from government 
                                                   
3 To put it more precisely, smokers tend to be characterized as having a low level of 
patience. Thus, smokers have a hyperbolic time discount rate (Kang and Ikeda 2014). Low 
patience is defined as being less patient when making immediate future choices compared 
with distant future choices, and is thought to result in overconsumption and 
over-borrowing (Laibson 1997; Laibson et al. 2007). 
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spending on social security and unemployment measures, if they themselves have 
to bear the expense, then the amounts of spending are thought to be at the 
optimum level. In other words, seemingly myopic people adhere to the principle 
that “the beneficiary pays”. However, a problem arises when people demand such 
spending but do not bear the cost. There is the possibility that present-oriented 
people strategically behave myopically by anticipating social security in the future. 
Furthermore, they do not intend to bear the expense of such spending. In this case, 
the problem of the free rider arises. For those who are willing to enjoy free ridding, 
the tax burden is considered high. Here, Hypothesis 2 is postulated.  
 
Hypothesis 2: 
Smokers tend to perceive the tax level as high. 
 
3. Data  
JGSS data is used for the empirical analysis in this paper. To collect JGSS 
data, a two-stage stratified sampling was used.4 The respondents were adults aged 
18 years and older. The JGSS included various questions concerning individuals’ 
characteristics using face-to-face interviews. Hence, from the JGSS, I was able to 
source data concerning smoking behavior, marital and demographic (age and sex) 
status, annual household income,5 years of schooling, political views, and health 
status. Furthermore, information regarding individuals’ perceptions about tax 
burden and specific government spending for seven categories were available. 
JGSS surveys have been conducted throughout Japan since 2000, with the most 
recent carried out in 2012. However, data on perceptions about government 
spending were only collected in 2000, 2001, 2003, and 2006. Therefore, the JGSS 
dataset used in this study only covers 2000, 2001, 2003, and 2006.  
The definitions of the variables used in the regression estimations are shown 
in Table 1. The key dependent variables are Tax burden and various kinds of 
government spending such as that on social security and pensions (Social), 
employment and unemployment measures (Employment), crime reduction (Crime), 
                                                   
4 Data for this secondary analysis, “Japanese General Social Survey (JGSS), Ichiro 
Tanioka”, was provided by the Social Science Japan Data Archive, Information Center for 
Social Science Research on Japan, Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo. 
5 In the original dataset, annual earnings were grouped into 19 categories, and for the 
present study it was assumed that everyone in each category earned the midpoint value. 
For the top category of “23 million yen and above”, it was assumed that everyone earned 23 
million yen. Among all observations, observations of the top category are slightly less than 
1 percent. Therefore, the issue of top-coding is not serious. 
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education (Education), public works projects such as road construction and river 
control (Construction), environmental issues (Environment), and foreign aid (AID). 
One question in the JGSS concerning Tax burden asked, “Do you think the amount 
of income tax you have to pay is high?” There are five response options, ranging 
from 1 (too low) to 5 (too high). Tax burden represents the value of the respondents’ 
responses.  
Concerning government spending, respondents were asked, “What do you 
think of the amount of government spending in the following areas?” For each type 
of spending, there are three response options ranging from 1 (too little) to 3 (too 
much). Social is the value of the respondents’ responses with respect to spending 
on social security and pensions. A lower Social value (the same is true for 
Employment, Crime, Education, Construction, Environment, and AID) will show 
that respondents consider government spending on social security and pension as 
insufficient. This can be interpreted to mean that respondents demand greater 
amounts of government spending in these areas. 
Table 1 shows that values of Social is 0.9 points smaller for smokers than 
non-smokers, while that of Employment is 0.7 points smaller for smokers than 
non-smokers. This implies that spending on social security, pensions and 
unemployment measures are not perceived to be sufficient for smokers compared 
with non−smokers. In addition, there is not a significant difference in government 
spending between smokers and non−smokers. Turning to Tax burden, its value is 
0.9 points larger for smokers than non−smokers, indicating that smokers perceive 
the tax burden as higher than non−smokers. These results are in line with 
Hypotheses 1 and 2.  
For a closer look into the differences between the perceptions of smokers and 
non-smokers about government spending and tax burden, a regression estimation 
is used. 
 
4. Estimation method and results 
 
4.1. Econometric framework 
For the purpose of exploring how time preference influences perceptions 
about specific government spending, the estimated function is as follows: 
Y i = 0 + 1Smoker i + 2Income i + 3Age i + 4Marriedi + 5Childi + 6Schoolingi + 
7Unemployedi + 8Malei + 9Healthi + 10Progressivei + ui,  
where Y i represents the dependent variable for individual i such as Social, 
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Employment, Crime, Education, Construction, Environment, and AID. Regression 
parameters are represented by . The error term is represented by ui. There are 
seven equations because there are seven different dependent variables. If a 
correlation exists between the residuals of different equations, then a seemingly 
unrelated regression (SUR) model is appropriate (Greene 2008). Delaney and 
O’Toole (2007) attempted to ascertain the determinants of individuals’ preferences 
for government spending on social welfare, heath, and education. They also 
conducted a similar estimation (Delaney and O’Toole 2008) using different 
dependent variables. Assuming a correlation between equations, Delaney and 
O’Toole (2007, 2008) used a SUR model. This paper also uses a SUR model to 
examine perceived government spending for seven categories.  
During the study period, macroeconomic conditions in Japan experienced 
various exogenous shocks. Macroeconomic shocks are expected to affect an 
individual’s perceptions about government spending. Therefore, to include 
macroeconomic shocks, this study included year dummies. The amount of 
government spending for each project differs according to local government where 
respondents reside, which inevitably influences perceptions regarding government 
spending. In addition, various unobservable regional specific factors are thought to 
influence perceptions. JGSS data also contains information about the prefectures 
where the respondents live.6  Hence, prefecture dummies are incorporated to 
control for these effects. 
In this specification, to examine Hypothesis 1, Smoking is considered the key 
variable. Smokers prefer current benefits at the expense of any future benefits, 
meaning that in the future, smokers are more likely to experience reduced 
financial circumstances. The coefficient of Smoker is predicted to be negative when 
the dependent variable captures spending to support those in reduced 
circumstances. Among the dependent variables, Social and Employment are 
considered to support such individuals. Thus, it is predicted that the coefficient of 
Smoker is negative if Social and Employment are the dependent variables. 
Following previous research (e.g., Hockley and Harbour 1983; Ferris 1983 
1985; Schokkaert 1987; Delaney and O’Toole 2007, 2008), various socioeconomic 
factors are taken into account by incorporating various variables. Income and 
Unemployed are incorporated to capture economic condition effects. People with 
                                                   
6 A Japanese prefecture is considered the equivalent of a state in the United States or a 
province in Canada. Therefore, spatial correlation was assumed to be unique within the 
prefecture.   
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higher earnings are less likely to demand government support while unemployed 
people are more likely to. Therefore, where Social and Employment are dependent 
variables, Income and Unemployed are predicted to be positive and negative, 
respectively. The degree of education level captured by Schooling is considered to 
affect time preference and is also included. Older people typically demand greater 
government spending on social welfare (Sorensen 2013). Therefore, Age is 
predicted to be negative when Social and Employment are dependent variables. It 
has also been found that females are more likely than males to consider growth in 
social welfare spending important (Funk and Athmann 2008) and to support 
left-wing policies (Edlund and Pande 2002).7 To capture this, Male is included. 
Based on the findings of earlier studies (Funk and Athmann 2002; Edlund and 
Pande 2002), it is predicted that the coefficient of Male will be positive when Social 
and Employment are dependent variables. If people have young children, they 
support greater government spending on education because education produces an 
accumulation of human capital and in turn their child will earn higher earnings in 
the future. Parents are thought to hope that their child will become rich. Hence, 
Child is predicted to be negative when Education is the dependent variable. 
Smoker is thought to capture not only individuals’ preferences, but also their 
health status because smoking behavior can have a detrimental effect on health 
status. Therefore, smokers are thought to have poorer health than non-smokers 
and demand spending on social security even if the time discounting of smokers is 
not related to demands for spending. Hence, to identify the effect of smoking, the 
function includes dummies for health status (Health_2, Health_3, Health_4, 
Health_5), where Health_1 is the reference group. Furthermore, one’s political 
view may determine the demand for specific government spending. People with 
progressive views are thought to prefer social security, unemployment measures, 
and be interested in environmental issues. Accordingly, this paper incorporates 
dummies for political view (Progressive_2, Progressive_3, Progressive_4, 
Progressive_5), where Progressive _1 is the reference group. These dummies are 
predicted to be negative when the dependent variable is either Social, Employment, 
or Environment. 
In addition to estimations for government spending, to assess Hypotheses 2, 
the dependent variable Tax Burden is also included in the SUR model. From 
                                                   
7 It is acknowledged in quantitative historical work that women's suffrage has had a 
critical influence on the size of government and the allocation of public spending (e.g., Aidt 
and Dallal 2008; Lott and Kenny 1999; Miller 2008). 
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Hypothesis 2, Smoker is predicted to be positive. Apart from health status and 
Child, the control variables used in this paper are also incorporated as 
independent variables to examine the perceived tax burden stated in the existing 
literature (Yamamura 2014a).  
 
4.2. Results 
The results of government spending estimations are reported in Tables 2, 3 
and 4. The results of the full model are reported in Table 2. Tables 3 and 4 show 
results excluding some control variables. In each table, columns (1)–(7) present 
results when government spending for specific projects is a dependent variable; 
column (8) exhibits results when Tax burden is a dependent variable. According to 
the specifications, the number of observations differs because data regarding some 
independent variables were not available for some observations. 
 
4.2.1. Estimation results for Government spending 
With respect to the results of Tables 2, 3 and 4, a Breusch-Pagan test of 
independence between residuals yields a chi-squared coefficient of 1,394, 1,940, 
and 2,021, respectively. These suggest that the residuals are not independent and 
that a SUR model is more appropriate than the ordinary least squares method.  
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 2 show results when the dependent variables are 
Social and Employment, respectively. In columns (1) and (2), the coefficient for 
Smoker is negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Hence, 
smokers tend to perceive government spending on social security, pensions, and 
unemployment measures as low. This can be interpreted as implying that 
impatient people consider government spending for these projects as insufficient 
and therefore demand greater spending. That is, the results of Smoker concerning 
Social and Unemployment are consistent with Hypothesis 1. Furthermore, the 
absolute values of the coefficients of Smoker in columns (1) and (2) are 0.09 and 
0.10, respectively. Smokers perceive spending on social security and pensions to be 
0.09 points lower on the 3-point scale compared with non-smokers, while smokers 
perceive spending on unemployment measure to be 0.10 points lower compared 
with non-smokers. This is interpreted as a sufficiently sizable effect.  
Column (8) shows the result when the dependent variable is Tax burden. The 
coefficient of Smoker is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that 
smokers tend to perceive the tax burden as high. This is in line with Hypothesis 2. 
Furthermore, the absolute value of the coefficient of Smoker in column (8) is 0.07. 
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Smokers perceive the tax burden to be 0.07 points higher on the 5-point scale 
compared with non-smokers. 
Concerning the results of the control variables, Male is positive and significant 
in columns (1) and (2). Furthermore, its absolute values in columns (1) and (2) are 
0.08 and 0.11, respectively. These results show that gender has a sizable effect on 
evaluations about public spending for Social and Employment, which is congruent 
to the arguments in existing research (Edlund and Pande 2002; Funk and 
Athmann 2008). In addition, with respect to political view, Progressive_2, 
Progressive_3 Progressive_4, and Progressive_5 are negative and Progressive_3 
and Progressive_4 are statistically significant. This indicates that those who have 
progressive views tend to perceive government expenditure for Social and 
Employment as low. This is in line with the intuition.  
Column (3) shows results when Crime is the dependent variable; Income and 
Age are negative and statistically significant. People with higher earnings are 
more likely to be the targets of crime such as burglary or robbery. Furthermore, it 
is difficult for aged people to protect themselves against crime. It is for these 
reasons that high earners and older people perceive government spending on crime 
reduction as low and therefore demand greater spending.  
With Education as the dependent variable, column (4) shows Married and 
Schooling to be negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. My 
interpretation of these results is as follows. The result of Married reflects that 
married people are more likely to have child(ren) and so demand greater 
government spending on education for their child(ren). In my conjecture, even 
though Child is included, such an effect is not sufficiently disentangled from 
Married. Educated people think highly of schooling because they know that the 
return from schooling is sufficiently large and therefore they demand greater 
government spending on education. 
Column (5) shows the results of Construction. Construction work is mainly 
based on physical labor, which benefits low-educated people. This might be why 
Schooling is positive and statistically significant. In Japan, rent-seeking behavior 
in the construction industry is considered to contribute to increase government 
expenditure in the construction industry (Yamamura and Kondoh 2013). There is 
collusion between politicians, bureaucrats, and business leaders in Japan. 
Progressive-thinking people are reasonably inclined to criticize structural collusion. 
This might explain why Progressive_4 and Progressive_5 are significant and 
positive. In contrast with Construction, as reported in column (6) with 
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Environment as the dependent variable, Schooling, Progressive_2, Progressive_3 
Progressive_4, and Progressive_5 are negative and significant. Educated and 
progressive-minded people are more likely to consider environmental issues as 
important (e.g., Dastrup et al. 2012; Costa and Kahn 2013a, 2013b; Cragg et al. 
2013). This might lead educated and progressive-minded people to demand greater 
government spending on environmental issues, which is consistent with the results 
in column (6).  
For robustness checks of the results concerning Hypotheses 1 and 2, Tables 3 
and 4 exhibit the results for Smoker, regarded as the key variable to examine the 
hypotheses. This paper reported the results of alternative specifications where 
some variables were excluded from the specification reported in Table 2. In the 
alternative specifications, sample size naturally increases because respondents 
who did not answer the questions used in the specification in Table 2 are included 
in the alternative specifications. Thus, in these estimations, respondents are not 
restricted as were the estimations of Table 2. In Tables 3 and 4, the coefficients of 
Smoker continue to be negative and statistically significant in columns (1) and (2), 
whereas that of Smoker continues to be positive and statistically significant in 
column (8). Tables 3 and 4 suggest the results of Smoker are robust to alternative 
specifications. The combined results of Tables 2–4 strongly support Hypotheses 1 
and 2. Furthermore, column (7) in Tables 3 and 4, where the dependent variable is 
AID, shows Smoker to be positive and significantly positive, indicating that 
smokers perceive government spending on foreign aid as too high. Foreign aid does 
not improve the situation of domestic populations; this is despite the fact that such 
aid is thought to contribute to improve international relationships between Japan 
and donee nations. The results for government spending on foreign aid reflect that 
smokers demand government spending that will offer them direct and immediate 
benefits.  
The estimation results show the following: (1) smokers consider government 
spending on social security and unemployment measures to be low although such a 
tendency is not observed for government spending on other projects such as crime, 
education, public works, environment issues, and foreign aid; (2) smokers perceive 
the burden of tax to be high. From this, I derive the argument that people with a 
high time discount rate tend to rely on government support and therefore demand 
greater spending on social security, pensions, and unemployment measures, and 
are not willing to bear the expense for such spending. That is, people characterized 
by impatience possibly exhibit present-oriented behavior in the short term by 
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anticipating government support in the future at the expense of other citizens. 
Seemingly myopic people pursue short-term benefits and rely on government 
support in the future. In other words, government spending on security, pensions, 
and unemployment gives people with higher time discount rates a greater 
motivation to become free riders. Thus, there is the possibility that myopic people 
prefer policies that trigger the moral hazard problem. 
 
5. Conclusions  
 
Those who are impatient and myopic seem to prefer short-term benefits 
rather than long-term ones. In other words, impatient and myopic people are 
considered to enjoy current benefits at the expense of future benefits. This holds 
true if political processes and the influence of government on economic outcomes 
are not considered. However, in the real world, government plays a role in 
providing public goods, which possibly changes individual behavior. Thus, it is 
important to analyze the relationship between individual time discounting and 
moral hazard when economic policy is considered. Despite the importance of this 
issue, it has not been sufficiently addressed by existing research. Therefore, this 
paper attempted to investigate how myopic people perceive government spending 
and their tax burden by bridging behavioral economics and political economy. 
The major findings of this paper are: (1) smokers consider government 
spending on social security and unemployment measures to be low and (2) smokers 
perceive the burden of tax to be high. These imply that smokers tend to assign 
greater importance to expenditure that enables them to personally enjoy the 
benefit of public support, but they are less willing to bear its expense. It is inferred 
from the estimation results that impatient people behave myopically and are 
therefore more likely to experience personal problems in the future, while also 
anticipating that government expenditure will help them. The results of this paper 
suggest that myopic people prefer policies that enable them to enjoy its benefit in 
the future, which triggers the moral hazard problem. The moral hazard problem is 
serious if myopic people form a special interest group for their long-term benefit. 
The JGSS data used in this paper does not include information that directly 
measures individual time discount rate. To address this issue, this paper treats the 
smoking dummy as a proxy for impatience, regarded as high time discounting; this 
assumption is very strong. Some control variables appear to be correlated with the 
time discount rate even if a smoking dummy is incorporated. The reason for this is 
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that the time discount rate cannot be directly observed and is included in the error 
term. Inevitably, a correlation between the error term and independent variable 
leads to endogenous bias. When this occurs, a variable should be used to directly 
measure the time discount rate for a closer examination of the relationship 
between time preference and perceptions of government spending and tax burden. 
This is an issue that remains to be addressed in future work. 
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     Table 1 
Basic statistics and definitions of variables used for estimations 
 Definitions Smokers Non- 
smokers 
Social 
 
Perceptions regarding amount of government spending on social 
security and pensions. 
Question in questionnaire: What do you think of the amount of 
government spending in the following areas? 
There are three response options: 1 (too little)–3 (too much). 
1.34 1.43 
Employment  
 
Perceptions regarding amount of government spending on 
employment and unemployment measures. 
Question in questionnaire: What do you think of the amount of 
government spending in the following areas? 
There are three response options: 1 (too little)–3 (too much). 
1.31 1.38 
Crime 
 
Perceptions regarding amount of government spending on crime 
reduction. 
Question in questionnaire: What do you think of the amount of 
government spending in the following areas? 
There are three response options: 1 (too little)–3 (too much). 
1.46 1.47 
Education 
 
Perceptions regarding amount of government spending on 
education. 
Question in questionnaire: What do you think of the amount of 
government spending in the following areas? 
There are three response options: 1 (too little)–3 (too much). 
1.58 1.57 
Construction 
 
Perceptions regarding amount of government spending on public 
works projects such as road construction and river control. 
Question in questionnaire: What do you think of the amount of 
government spending in the following areas? 
There are three response options: 1 (too little)–3 (too much). 
2.36 2.35 
Environment 
 
Perceptions regarding amount of government spending on 
environmental issues. 
Question in questionnaire: What do you think of the amount of 
government spending in the following areas? 
1.43 1.45 
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There are three response options: 1 (too little)–3 (too much). 
Tax burden Degree of perceived tax burden 
Question in questionnaire: Do you think the amount of income tax 
you have to pay is high? 
There are five response options: 1 (too low)–5 (too high). Tax 
burden is the value of the respondents’ responses. 
4.25 4.16 
AID Perceived amount of government spending for Foreign aid. 
Question in questionnaire: What do you think of the amount of 
government spending in the following areas? 
There are three response options: 1 (too little)–3 (too much)s 
2.44 2.39 
Smoker The value is 1 if the respondent is currently a smoker, otherwise 0. −−− −−− 
Income Individual household income 
(million yen) 
7.15 7.52 
Age Age (years) 47.8 51.7 
Married The value is 1 if the respondent is currently married, otherwise 0. 0.80 0.83 
Child The value is 1 if the respondents have a child below 6 years old.  0.15 0.08 
Schooling 
 
Years of schooling 12.6 12.7 
Unemployed The value is 1 if the respondent is currently unemployed, 
otherwise 0. 
0.01 0.01 
Male The value is 1 if the respondent is male, otherwise 0. 0.81 0.54 
Progressive_1 Concerning political views, it takes 1 if respondents choose 1, 
otherwise 0. 
1 (conservative)–5 (progressive) 
0.08 0.09 
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Progressive_2 Concerning political views, it takes 1 if respondents choose 2, 
otherwise 0. 
1 (conservative)–5 (progressive) 
0.20 0.23 
Progressive_3 Concerning political views, it takes 1 if respondents choose 3, 
otherwise 0. 
1 (conservative)–5 (progressive) 
0.41 0.42 
Progressive_4 Concerning political views, it takes 1 if respondents choose 4, 
otherwise 0. 
1 (conservative)–5 (progressive) 
0.24 0.21 
Progressive_5 Concerning political views, it takes 1 if respondents choose 5, 
otherwise 0. 
1 (conservative)–5 (progressive) 
0.06 0.04 
Health_1 Concerning health condition, it takes 1 if respondents choose 1, 
otherwise 0; 1 (poor)–5 (good). 
0.05 0.06 
Health_2 Concerning health condition, it takes 1 if respondents choose 2, 
otherwise 0; 1 (poor)–5 (good). 
0.13 0.15 
Health_3 Concerning health condition, it takes 1 if respondents choose 3, 
otherwise 0; 1 (poor)–5 (good). 
0.36 0.33 
Health_4 Concerning health condition, it takes 1 if respondents choose 4, 
otherwise 0; 1 (poor)–5 (good). 
0.23 0.24 
Health_5 Concerning health condition, it takes 1 if respondents choose 5, 
otherwise 0; 1 (poor)–5 (good). 
0.22 0.23 
 
Sample is used for baseline estimations presented in Table 2. 
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Table 2 Seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) estimation where the dependent variable is government spending 
   Government spending    Tax 
burden 
 (1) 
Social 
(2) 
Employment 
 
(3) 
Crime 
 
(4) 
Education 
 
(5) 
Construction 
 
(6) 
Environment 
 
(7) 
AID 
 (8) 
 
Smoker −0.09*** 
(−3.15) 
−0.10*** 
(−3.55) 
−0.02 
(−0.84) 
0.003 
(0.11) 
0.01 
(0.40) 
−0.001 
(−0.05) 
−0.05 
(1.51) 
 0.07* 
(1.66) 
Income 0.02 
 (0.80) 
0.06* 
(1.90) 
−0.06* 
(−1.78) 
−0.03 
(−0.96) 
0.04 
(1.11) 
−0.03 
(−0.97) 
−0.06* 
(−1.70) 
 0.12** 
(2.30) 
Age 0.001 
(0.48) 
−0.001 
(−0.90) 
−0.002** 
(−2.12) 
0.001 
(1.34) 
−0.001 
(−1.20) 
−0.001 
(−0.83) 
0.005*** 
(3.73) 
 −0.01*** 
(−2.84) 
Married −0.06 
(−1.48) 
−0.04 
(−1.07) 
−0.02 
(−0.65) 
−0.14*** 
(−3.60) 
0.04 
(0.88) 
−0.08** 
(−2.02) 
0.01 
(0.43) 
 0.07 
(1.25) 
Child −0.03 
(−0.71) 
−0.01 
(−0.27) 
0.01 
(0.25) 
−0.03 
(−0.68) 
0.02 
(0.40) 
−0.01 
(−0.18) 
0.03 
(0.58) 
 −0.10 
(−1.38) 
Schooling 
 
−0.01 
(−1.60) 
−0.002 
(−0.49) 
−0.01 
(−1.58) 
−0.02*** 
(−3.84) 
0.03*** 
(4.09) 
−0.04*** 
(−7.35) 
−0.004 
(−0.66) 
 −0.01** 
(−1.68) 
Unemployed −0.07 
(−0.65) 
−0.15 
(−1.40) 
−0.17 
(−1.60) 
0.09 
(0.85) 
0.10 
(0.78) 
−0.01 
(−0.08) 
0.15 
(1.15) 
 −0.02 
(−0.15) 
Male 0.08*** 
(2.78) 
0.11*** 
(3.73) 
−0.002 
(−0.00) 
0.05* 
(1.76) 
−0.02 
(−0.72) 
−0.06** 
(−2.26) 
0.05 
(1.50) 
 −0.04 
(−0.95) 
Progressive_1  <Reference group> 
 
   
Progressive_2 −0.04 
(−0.69) 
−0.06 
(−1.07) 
−0.01 
(−0.14) 
0.05 
(0.85) 
0.05 
(0.69) 
−0.10* 
(−1.83) 
0.09 
(1.42) 
 0.08 
(0.92) 
Progressive_3 −0.12** 
(−2.08) 
−0.14** 
(−2.54) 
0.05 
(1.01) 
0.05 
(0.89) 
0.10 
(1.47) 
−0.12** 
(−2.18) 
0.06 
(0.96) 
 0.23*** 
(2.73) 
Progressive_4 −0.15** 
(−−2.57) 
−0.15** 
(−2.54) 
0.03 
(0.59) 
−0.07 
(−1.20) 
0.21*** 
(2.89) 
−0.23*** 
(−3.82) 
0.09 
(1.33) 
 0.19** 
(2.18) 
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Progressive_5 −0.10 
(−1.34) 
−0.04 
(−0.63) 
−0.05 
(−0.65) 
−0.09 
(−1.21) 
0.29*** 
(2.96) 
−0.23*** 
(−2.93) 
0.21** 
(2.32) 
 0.38*** 
(3.15) 
Health_1 <Reference group> 
 
   
Health_2 0.004 
(0.05) 
−0.15* 
(−1.84) 
−0.18** 
(−2.27) 
−0.09 
(−1.12) 
0.15 
(1.42) 
−0.17** 
(−2.05) 
0.23** 
(2.37) 
    −0.02 
(−0.19) 
Health_3 0.05 
(0.75) 
−0.05 
(−0.75) 
−0.05 
(−0.71) 
−0.02 
(−0.30) 
0.07 
(0.70) 
−0.07 
(−0.97) 
0.23** 
(2.55) 
 0.01 
(0.06) 
Health_4 0.07 
(0.86) 
−0.03 
(−0.44) 
−0.08 
(−1.05) 
−0.02 
(−0.25) 
0.11 
(1.17) 
−0.10 
(−1.30) 
0.27*** 
(2.87) 
 −0.06 
  (−0.55) 
Health_5 0.16** 
(2.03) 
0.03 
(0.48) 
−0.02 
(−0.34) 
0.03 
(0.48) 
0.11 
(1.09) 
−0.09 
(−1.09) 
0.21** 
(2.22) 
 −0.05 
(−0.42) 
R−square 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.12 0.06  0.06 
Observations 1664 1664 1664 1664 1664 1664 1664  1664 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are z−statistics. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. In all 
estimations, constant, prefecture dummies, and year dummies were included as independent variables. 
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Table 3. Seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) estimation where the dependent variable is government spending: Child and Dummies 
for health status are deleted from the set of independent variables shown in Table 2. 
   Government spending    Tax  
burden 
 (1) 
Social 
(2) 
Employment 
 
(3) 
Crime 
 
(4) 
Education 
 
(5) 
Construction 
 
(6) 
Environment 
 
(7) 
AID 
 (8) 
 
Smoker −0.07*** 
(−2.87) 
−0.06** 
(−2.48) 
−0.01 
(−0.73) 
0.01 
(0.56) 
0.01 
(0.42) 
0.01 
(0.68) 
0.07** 
(2.42) 
 −0.09** 
(−2.31) 
R-square 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.10 0.05  0.05 
Observations 2193 2193 2193 2193 2193 2193 2193  2193 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics. ** indicates significance at the 5% level.  
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Table 4. Seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) estimation where the dependent variable is government spending: Child and dummies 
for health status and those for political position (progressiveness) are excluded from the set of independent variables shown in Table 2. 
 
   Government spending    Tax  
burden 
 (1) 
Social 
(2) 
Employment 
 
(3) 
Crime 
 
(4) 
Education 
 
(5) 
Construction 
 
(6) 
Environment 
 
(7) 
AID 
 (8) 
 
Smoker −0.08*** 
(−3.16) 
−0.07*** 
(−2.72) 
−0.01 
(−0.57) 
0.01 
(0.59) 
0.01 
(0.42) 
0.01 
(0.62) 
0.06** 
(2.33) 
 0.11*** 
(2.85) 
R-square 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.08 0.08  0.05 
Observations 2275 2275 2275 2275 2275 2275 2275  2275 
 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics. ** and *** indicate significance at the 5 and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
